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THE ELIMINATION OF MRE 803A?
PEOPLE v. GURSKY AND ITS
QUALIFICATION OF SPONTANEOUS
STATEMENTS
Cristina Roberti
INTRODUCTION
On multiple occasions in 2005 and 2006, Jason Gursky
sexually molested his girlfriend’s daughter, who was six and
seven years old at the time of the offenses.1 The police did not
discover the sexual abuse until a close family friend of the
victim’s mother (and the victim) questioned the young girl and
asked “if anyone had been touching her.”2 When the young girl
responded with detailed and specific answers, volunteering
information as to how and when Gursky had sexually molested
her, the family friend reported the abuse to the police.3
Gursky’s conviction in July 20104 was the justice the young
victim deserved. However, the court’s limitation on the usage
of a hearsay exception5 created a major setback for child
victims of sexual abuse, as the limitation introduced an
 J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2012; B.A. Boston College, 2009. I
would like to thank my family for all of their love and support. Special
thanks to Professor Frederic Bloom and Scott Krischke for their guidance. I
would also like to thank the entire Journal of Law and Policy staff for all of
their advice and assistance.
1
People v. Gursky (Gursky II), 786 N.W.2d 579, 58283 (Mich. 2010).
2
Id. at 583.
3
Id. at 58384.
4
Id. at 582, 597 (affirming defendant’s 2008 conviction of four counts
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing his girlfriend’s
child).
5
Id. at 591.
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additional and significant hurdle to the successful prosecution
of their abusers.
While upholding defendant Gursky’s conviction, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that the young victim’s statements
to her family friend in 2006, when she had first disclosed the
sexual abuse, were inadmissible as evidence because the child
had not introduced the subject of sexual abuse.6 The court thus
established that whenever a child does not broach the subject of
sexual abuse, the child’s statements to an adult regarding the
sexual abuse will not fall within Michigan Rule of Evidence
(“MRE”) 803A, an exception to the hearsay rule that
specifically applies in child sexual abuse cases.7 The Gursky
court’s restriction of MRE 803A negates the rule’s very purpose
of facilitating the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases.8
Moreover, the court acted without justification for or foresight
into the consequences of such a limiting interpretation. Had the
court adequately balanced the state’s interest in the successful
prosecution of child sexual abuse cases with the court’s interest
in ensuring the reliability and trustworthiness of hearsay
evidence presented at trial, such a limiting interpretation would
9
not have emerged.
This Note argues that, given the unique nature of child
sexual abuse cases, the court should use a totality of the
circumstances approach that analyzes all of the child’s
statements and the circumstances in which they were made, in
order to determine admissibility. This approach more adequately
serves to further the state’s interests without serving as an
additional impediment to the prosecution of child sexual abuse
cases.
Part I of this Note addresses the various difficulties in
prosecuting child sexual abuse cases, including evidence that
6

Id. at 591–92.
Id. (interpreting the contours of MICH. R. EVID. 803A). For Rule 803A
in its entirety, see infra Part II.
8
See infra Part II.
9
See Lynne E. Radke, Note, Michigan’s New Hearsay Exception: The
“Reinstatement” of the Common Law Tender Years Rule, 70 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 377, 405–06 (1993).
7
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children rarely disclose sexual abuse, lack of existing physical
evidence and witnesses, and the court’s interest in weeding out
false accusations. Part II discusses the judicial and legislative
responses to the problems faced by the prosecution, including
the adoption of MRE 803A and its application by the Michigan
courts. Part III of this Note discusses the Gursky case, including
the facts and the analysis of the statements at issue by both the
Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court.
Part IV argues that the ultimate holding in Gursky essentially
eliminated MRE 803A and that the decision will make it more
difficult to prosecute child sexual abuse cases in Michigan. Part
V explains how a totality of the circumstances approach, used
by the Michigan Court of Appeals in the Gursky case and
various other states, is a more appropriate test that weighs the
state’s interests without hindering prosecutorial efforts.
I. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
The victim in Gursky is among many children in the United
States who fall victim to sexual abuse. Child sexual abuse is a
growing epidemic in the United States and given its prevalence,
the Supreme Court has recognized the need to protect the
nation’s children from sexual abuse as a compelling interest.10
Unfortunately, prosecutors face many obstacles in their attempts
to prosecute dangerous sexual predators.11 The underreporting of
cases, the fact that most children do not disclose sexual abuse on
their own accord, the lack of physical evidence or witnesses in
these cases, and the court’s need to identify false accusations, all
serve as impediments for the prosecution and hinder their efforts
12
to protect child victims from their abusers.
Although it is clear that incidents of child sexual abuse are

10

See Lynn McLain, Children Are Losing Maryland’s “Tender Years”
War, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 21, 25–26 (1997) (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495
U.S. 103, 109 (1990)).
11
See infra Part I for a discussion of the problems faced by prosecutors.
12
See infra Part I.
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widespread, the statistics are inconsistent and often inaccurate.13
One study found that such abuse has been reported up to 80,000
times a year.14 Another report indicates that in 1993 alone, there
were over 200,000 incidents of child sexual abuse.15 Some
researchers estimate that in the United States, one out of every
six boys, and one out of every four girls, is sexually abused.16
One study estimated that in 2008, 772,000 children were victims
of abuse or neglect and around nine percent of those were
victims of sexual abuse.17
While these numbers are alarming, the reason for the
disparities among them is even more alarming. Due to the
underreporting of child sexual abuse, these statistics fail to
accurately reflect the actual number of instances of child sexual
abuse.18 Underreporting is mostly a result of the fact that most
13

Tara Ney, Assessing Allegations in Child Sexual Abuse: An Overview,
in TRUE AND FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: ASSESSMENT
AND CASE MANAGEMENT 3, 6 (Tara Ney ed., 1995).
14
AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, FACTS FOR
FAMILIES: CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (2008) [hereinafter FACTS FOR FAMILIES],
available at http://www.aacap.org/galleries/FactsForFamilies/09_child_sexual
_abuse.pdf.
15
KIMBERLY A. MCCABE, CHILD ABUSE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 33 (David A. Schultz & Christina DeJong eds., 2003) (citing
ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE
STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 4 (1996), available at http://www.
fact.on.ca/Info/vac/nis3.pdf).
16
Child Sexual Abuse, NAT’L CTR. FOR PTSD, http://www.ptsd.
va.gov/public/pages/child-sexual-abuse.asp (last updated Oct. 7, 2011).
17
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT
2008 xiii (2008), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/
cm08/cm08.pdf.
18
See FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14; MCCABE, supra note 15, at
33; see also SARAH H. RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, CHILDREN AND THE
LAW 133 (2003); HOLLIDA WAKEFIELD & RALPH UNDERWAGER,
ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 255 (1988) (“At present, there is not
enough solid data to claim that the frequency of child sexual abuse in the true
state of nature is known.”). “Because sexual abuse is usually a hidden
offense, there are no statistics on how many cases occur each year. Statistics
cover only the cases that are disclosed to child protection agencies or to law
enforcement.” David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and
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sexually abused children never disclose the abuse.19 In fact,
because of such lack of disclosure, in order to collect more
accurate data concerning the prevalence of child sexual abuse,
retrospective studies are often conducted where adults are asked
20
about their childhood experiences. One retrospective study
indicates that only 33.3% of adults who were sexually abused as
a child ever disclosed the abuse to anyone during their
childhood.21 In another retrospective study conducted on a
sample of adults who had disclosed the abuse when they were
children, over 50% of the adults stated that when they disclosed
the abuse in their youth, they were not believed. 22
There are many reasons why children do not disclose sexual
abuse. Often an abused child fears the offender, blames herself23
for the sexual abuse, or experiences negative emotions like
embarrassment, shame, and anger.24 In many cases, child
Nature of Child Sexual Abuse, FUTURE CHILD., Summer/Fall 1994, at 31, 32;
see also Kamala London et al., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does
the Research Tell Us About the Ways that Children Tell?, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 194, 194 (2005); McLain, supra note 10, at 28.
19
MARK A. WINTON & BARBARA A. MARA, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
48 (2001); London et al., supra note 18, at 194.
20
However, either because victims will continue to repress their
memories of sexual abuse into their adulthood or remain fearful or hesitant
towards disclosure, these retroactive studies still result in an underestimation
of the actual rate of child sexual abuse. WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra
note 18, at 258–59. See supra Part I for a more in depth discussion about the
underreporting of, and inaccuracy in, statistics concerning the prevalence of
child sexual abuse.
21
London et al., supra note 18, at 198–201. London analyzed ten
retrospective studies and concluded that “only one third of adults who
suffered CSA revealed the abuse to anyone during childhood.” Id. at 201.
22
Ney, supra note 13, at 6 (citing Ralph Brown et al., Preliminary
Findings of the Long-Term Effects of Childhood Abuse: A Study of Survivors
(1994) (unpublished manuscript)).
23
Both boys and girls are victims of child sexual abuse. See London et
al., supra note 18, at 204–06, for a discussion on the differences in the rate
of disclosure between boys and girls.
24
Child Sexual Abuse, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&Document
ID=32315 (last visited Nov. 5, 2011); see also RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra
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abusers threaten or manipulate their victims, often using
25
aggressive tactics. Often the abusers warn of the potential
consequences if the child should divulge the sexual abuse26 and
in many instances, abusers tell their victims to keep the events a
27
secret. Some abusers use physical force, which can result in a
child not disclosing the sexual abuse in fear of retaliation.28
Aside from fear, children are also reluctant to disclose abuse
29
due to feelings of self-doubt and helplessness. Child victims of
sexual abuse usually develop low self-esteem and can be
mistrusting of adults, making disclosure to someone capable of
stopping or reporting the abuse even more unlikely.30
Michigan courts have recognized that a child victim may
never reveal such abuse outright. In a 1930 case, People v.
Baker, for example, the court noted that a child’s disclosure of
sexual abuse may be delayed because of fear or other similar
circumstances.31 In Baker, where the victim’s father told her not
to disclose what had happened, the court acknowledged that
“complaining of [her own father’s acts] would not occur to her”
and the child’s “telling of the affair would more naturally arise
as the relation of an unusual occurrence and might be delayed
32
until something arose to suggest it.” After Baker, Michigan
courts continually recognized that sexually abused children often
note 18, at 133; WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 18, at 258 (“The
secrecy, shame, and stigma which has surrounded victims and abusers may
lead some to hide child sexual abuse.”); WINTON & MARA, supra note 19, at
48.
25
Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 24.
26
FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14.
27
See, e.g., People v. Whipple, No. 288591, 2010 WL 395747, at *2
(Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2010).
28
Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 24.
29
See London et al., supra note 18, at 195 (citing Roland Summit, The
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
177–93 (1983)).
30
See FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14.
31
People v. Baker, 232 N.W. 381, 383 (Mich. 1930).
32
Id. Thus, the court in Baker held that a child’s statements to her
housekeeper were admissible into evidence and the conviction of the victim’s
father was affirmed. Id.

The Elimination of MRE 803A?

273

feel threatened and are fearful of disclosing the incidents of
33
sexual abuse. Further, the courts acknowledged that sexual
crimes against children are often underreported because of
“various lamentable factors, including, but not limited to, the
victim being related to the offender, the victim’s age, or the
victim’s feelings of fear, embarrassment, or shame.”34
Another reason for lack of disclosure is that in most cases of
35
child sexual abuse the victims know their abusers. In these
cases the child is often trapped between his or her love or
loyalty for the abuser and the realization that the abuse is
wrong.36 In cases where the abuser is the victim’s family
member, the child often fears that by disclosing the abuse, he or
she will break up the family or incur the shame of other family
members.37 Additionally, in sexual abuse cases where a family
member is the abuser, the families are characteristically
“secretive in nearly all of their family activities, overly
possessive of their children, and operate in an environment
where the abused child and his or her abuser are often alone
with each other.”38
An additional impediment to a child reporting abuse is that,
because of the child’s immaturity, “a young child may not
know, or may know only on some intuitive level, that what is

33

See, e.g., People v. Hammons, 534 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding the child’s delay in relating the events of sexual abuse
was excusable “because of the nine-year-old complainant’s fear of reprisal
against her father, the defendant”); People v. Foreman, 410 N.W.2d 289,
293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), vacated, 432 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. 1988).
34
People v. Cooper, 559 N.W.2d 90, 92–93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(citing Donald Dripps et al., Special Issue on Women and the Law Panel
Discussion: Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 134–37
(1994)).
35
RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 18, at 133. Less than one-half of the
cases of child sexual abuse are extrafamilial. MCCABE, supra note 15, at 38;
Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 24.
36
FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14.
37
Id.
38
MCCABE, supra note 15, at 35 (citing SUZANNE SGROI, HANDBOOK OF
CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1982)).
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happening is wrong and uncomfortable.”39 Further, children who
are sexually abused may not be capable of expressing their
experiences because of their lack of knowledge or
understanding.40 Even children with a better understanding may
be uncomfortable disclosing the details of the abuse because of
the discomfort they feel towards sexual topics at such a young
age.41
In fact, many psychiatrists are suspicious if a child readily
discloses abuse because of the difficulties children typically face
in reporting abuse, as well as the statistical evidence supporting
42
lack of disclosure. One study suggests that, “only those
children who initially deny abuse, then make a sexual abuse
allegation, then recant it, and later re-disclose, should be
considered reliable cases of sexual abuse.”43 One expert
psychiatrist testified that had she “heard about lengthy
disclosures with a specific beginning, middle, and end to the
story [she] would have been less impressed since that type of
44
recounting is not likely with sexually abused children.”
A child typically discloses the sexual abuse when another
adult, aside from the abuser, creates a safe environment for the
child in which he or she feels comfortable enough to talk about
the abuse.45 Children are thus more likely to disclose the sexual
abuse “when talking to someone who appears to ‘already know’
and is not judgmental, critical or threatening.”46 As a result,
when children disclose their sexual abuse, they usually do not
introduce the subject of sexual abuse of their own accord.47
39

McLain, supra note 10, at 28.
See MCCABE, supra note 15, at 34.
41
See, e.g., People v. Whipple, No. 288591, 2010 WL 395747, at *2
(Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2010) (citing People v. Hammons, 534 N.W.2d
183, 185 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)).
42
London et al., supra note 18, at 196.
43
Id.
44
Id. (quoting Lillie v. Newcastle City Council, [2002] EWHC (QB)
1600).
45
See FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14.
46
Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 24.
47
See WINTON & MARA, supra note 19, at 48; London et al., supra note
40

The Elimination of MRE 803A?

275

Without child victims alerting adults to the abuse,
prosecutors must rely on the availability of other evidence or
indicators in order to prosecute such crimes. Unfortunately, the
lack of physical evidence48 in child sexual abuse cases presents
prosecutors with an additional hurdle that makes such offenses
difficult to discover, investigate, and prosecute.49 In most cases,
there are no physical indicators of sexual abuse.50 In fact, “most
perpetrators of child sexual abuse do not leave evidence in terms
of sperm, blood, or tears in the child’s genital area because, in
most cases of child sexual assault, vaginal or anal penetration
51
does not occur.” Further, a child usually displays “no obvious
external signs” of sexual abuse, making discovery very
difficult.52 Physical signs may be detected by a physician53 but
such detection is dependent on the child disclosing the abuse
soon after the incident.54 In addition, there are no standard
psychological symptoms a child displays that indicate a child has
been sexually abused.55 Without the availability of physical
evidence, a child’s statements generally constitute the central
evidence in a child sexual abuse case. 56
18, at 195.
48
See London et al., supra note 18, at 194 (explaining that medical and
physical evidence is lacking in the vast majority of child sex abuse cases).
49
People v. Cooper, 559 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Donald Dripps et al., supra note 34).
50
When a child does not report the abuse immediately, the physical
evidence will be gone by the time sexual abuse is discovered, if it is ever
discovered. MCCABE, supra note 15, at 42–43.
51
MCCABE, supra note 15, at 43.
52
FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14.
53
Id.
54
See supra Part I.
55
London et al., supra note 18, at 194.
56
Id. (citing J. Bays & D. Chadwick, Medical Diagnosis of the Sexually
Abused Child, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 91 (1993); A. Berenson et al.,
Appearance of the Hymen in Newborns, 87 PEDIATRICS 458 (1991)).
Typically, there is a lack of evidence in child sexual abuse cases. See
generally WINTON & MARA, supra note 19, at 51 (“[L]ess than 5 percent of
sexual abuse cases involve physical evidence.” (citation omitted)). There are
some clues to detecting child abuse that include abnormal behavior like
“‘acting out,’ engaging in precocious sexual activity, or withdrawing from a
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Aside from the dearth of physical evidence or indicators,
57
there is also a lack of witnesses to the abuse. Both the
Michigan courts and the U.S. Supreme Court have recognized
that child abuse offenses are more difficult to prosecute because
“they are generally committed under a shroud of secrecy,
leaving the victim as the only significant witness to the
offense.”58
The possibility of false accusations poses an additional
challenge. False accusations by children arise when a child
fabricates stories of abuse, or an adult with an ulterior motive
59
influences the child to make a statement that is untrue. Some
studies estimate the rate of “false positives” to be around two to
eight percent of all child abuse allegations.60 Such studies
indicate that the frequency of false allegations tends to be higher
in custody disputes.61 Often, parties in custody disputes hope to
discredit each other in order to prove that one is better fit to
care for the child than the other.62 In the context of these custody
battles, some parents may accuse their spouse of sexually
abusing their children.63 Consequently, if the court believes such
normal touch, such as a pat on the shoulder by a babysitter or a teacher[,]”
but these are vague and often hard to identify. See McLain, supra note 10, at
28 (citing JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES § 5.3 (3d ed. 1997)).
57
London et al., supra note 18, at 194.
58
People v. Cooper, 559 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987)).
59
Ney, supra note 13, at 5; see also WINTON & MARA, supra note 19, at
55–56.
60
Ney, supra note 13, at 6 (citing Arthur H. Green, Factors
Contributing to False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in Custody Disputes,
in ASSESSING CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTS: THE PROBLEM OF FALSE
ALLEGATIONS 177–89 (M. Robin ed., 1991)). False positives are “cases
where abuse is not occurring but is claimed to be [occurring].” Id.
61
Id.
62
Marion F. Ehrenberg & Michael F. Elterman, Evaluating Allegations
of Sexual Abuse in the Context of Divorce, Child Custody, and Access
Disputes, in TRUE AND FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE:
ASSESSMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 13, at 209, 211.
63
Id. (citing Elissa P. Benedek & Diane H. Schetky, Allegations of
Sexual Abuse in Child Custody and Visitation Disputes, in EMERGING ISSUES
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an accusation, the parent accused of the sexual abuse is likely to
lose contact with the child while the other parent is likely to
receive full custody.64 When these allegations are true, a grant of
full custody to a non-abusive parent is clearly in the best interest
of the child. However, a problem arises when one parent falsely
reports an instance of sexual abuse that never occurred, or
wrongfully influences the child to fabricate a story of sexual
65
abuse in order to obtain full custody. Psychiatrists have found
that young children can be improperly influenced by their
parent, another close family friend, or professionals, like
investigators or therapists.66
False accusations do not just occur in custody cases where
one parent accuses another parent. False accusations also arise
against adults who take care of children, like teachers, camp
counselors, or day care employees.67 Additionally, an adolescent
motivated by anger or a desire for the attention that accompanies
an accusation of sexual abuse can, on his or her own accord,
fabricate an incidence of sexual abuse.68
II. MRE 803A: THE LEGISLATURE’S RESPONSE TO THE
DIFFICULTIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
CASES
Faced with the difficulties of prosecuting sexual crimes
against children, states crafted evidentiary exceptions particular
to child sexual abuse cases in hopes of facilitating prosecutorial

IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 145–48 (Diane Schetky & Elissa Benedek
eds., 1985).
64
Id.
65
See WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 18, at 294–98.
66
For a scientific research study on the suggestibility of children, see
Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children:
Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33 (2000).
These same studies indicate that absent “significant prompting,” children may
hesitate to disclose incidents of sexual abuse. Id. at 34.
67
WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 18, at 299.
68
Id. at 300.
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efforts.69 Similarly, the Michigan judiciary and legislature
recognized the need to protect children and implemented
procedures and recording systems to aid the prosecution of these
crimes.70 Although it was not until 1990 that the legislature
71
adopted MRE 803A, a specific hearsay exception for child
sexual abuse cases, the state acknowledged the concerns for the
prosecution and recognized a similar exception as early as the
mid-1880s.72
Prior to the adoption of the Michigan Rules of Evidence in
1978, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized a common law
“tender years” exception to the hearsay rule in 1886.73 In
applying the tender years exception, the court in People v. Baker
held that “where the victim is of tender years, the testimony of
the details of her complaint may be introduced in corroboration
of her evidence, if her statement is shown to have been
spontaneous and without indication of manufacture.”74 However,
when the MRE was adopted in 1978, the legislature failed to
include a tender years exception.75 Given its absence in the rules,
the Michigan Supreme Court abolished the exception altogether
in People v. Kreiner in 1982.76
In the years following the Kreiner decision, Michigan courts
urged a reconsideration of the MRE because of the inherent
difficulty of prosecuting child sexual abuse cases.77 Ultimately,
69

For a discussion on New Jersey’s, Delaware’s, and Mississippi’s rules,
see infra Part V.
70
People v. Cooper, 559 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
71
See MICH. R. EVID. 803A.
72
People v. Gage, 28 N.W. 835, 836 (Mich. 1886); see also JAMES K.
ROBINSON ET AL., MICHIGAN COURT RULES PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 803A.1
(3d ed. 2009).
73
Gage, 28 N.W. at 836; see also People v. Baker, 232 N.W. 381
(Mich. 1930); Radke, supra note 9, at 382–83.
74
Baker, 232 N.W. at 383.
75
Radke, supra note 9, at 383.
76
People v. Kreiner, 329 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Mich. 1982).
77
See, e.g., People v. Lee, 442 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989) (Weaver, J., dissenting); People v. Verburg, 430 N.W.2d 775, 777
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that following Kreiner, courts are under
increasing pressure to expand the excited utterance exception to replace the
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in 1990, the legislature adopted MRE 803A and reinstated the
78
exception. MRE 803A reads:
A statement describing an incident that included a sexual
act performed with or on the declarant by the defendant
or an accomplice is admissible to the extent that it
corroborates testimony given by the declarant during the
same proceeding, provided:
1) the declarant was under the age of ten when the
statement was made;
2) the statement is shown to have been spontaneous and
without indication of manufacture;
3) either the declarant made the statement immediately
after the incident or any delay is excusable as having
been caused by fear or other equally effective
circumstance; and
4) the statement is introduced through the testimony of
someone other than the declarant.
If the declarant made more than one corroborative
statement about the incident, only the first is admissible
under this rule.
A statement may not be admitted under this rule unless
the proponent of the statement makes known to the
adverse party the intent to offer the statement, and the
particulars of the statement, sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to meet the statement.
This rule applies in criminal and delinquency
proceedings only.79
The purpose of the exception is to allow an adult to
corroborate out-of-court statements made by a child in order to
80
provide additional credibility to the child’s testimony in court.

tender years doctrine); see also Radke, supra note 9, at 387–88 (citing People
v. Straight, 424 N.W.2d 257 (Mich. 1988)).
78
See MICH. R. EVID. 803A.
79
MICH. R. EVID. 803A.
80
ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 72.
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The rule thus acknowledges that a young child, unfamiliar with
the courtroom or court proceedings, may feel more tense or
uncomfortable than he or she would outside the courthouse, and
may, as a result, testify less credibly and truthfully than he or
81
she would outside the courthouse environment. As a child may
also have difficulty articulating earlier events, the rule permits
an adult, better able to remember and articulate the earlier
event, to testify and corroborate the child victim’s statements.82
In adopting MRE 803A, the legislature balanced two
competing interests. The first was the need to protect children,
particularly sexually abused children. The state recognized that
to protect child victims of sexual abuse, the exception was
necessary to “remedy the unusual difficulties encountered in
prosecuting crimes in which the only witness is a young, fearful,
and uncommunicative child.”83 Despite the existence of two
similar hearsay exceptions, the “medical treatment exception”
recognized in MRE 803(4), and the “excited utterance
exception” recognized in MRE 803(2),84 the legislature opted to
create an additional exception with modifications specifically for
child sexual abuse cases.85 Most importantly, MRE 803A
86
dispensed of any contemporaneity requirement in the rule.
87
Unlike MRE 803(2), which requires that a statement admitted
under the “excited utterance exception” be made
contemporaneously with the event or condition, MRE 803A
contains no such requirement.88 In fact, MRE 803A specifically
81

Id.
See McLain, supra note 10, at 25.
83
Radke, supra note 9, at 405 (quoting Note, The Testimony of Child
Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 806, 817 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
84
MICH. R. EVID. 803(2), (4). For an explanation of these two
exceptions, see Radke, supra note 9, at 388–93.
85
ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 72.
86
See MICH. R. EVID. 803A; Radke, supra note 9, at 406.
87
The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule permits into
evidence “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.” MICH. R. EVID. 803(2).
88
Id. at 803A.
82
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excuses any delay between the sexual act and the statement,
acknowledging that such delay may be “caused by fear or other
equally effective circumstance.”89 Further, MRE 803A is
broader than MRE 803(4) in that the statement need not be made
90
for the purpose of medical treatment. In addition, unlike the
other two exceptions, the MRE 803A exception applies solely to
child sexual abuse cases.91
In codifying MRE 803A, the legislature was also concerned
with the rights of the accused. Accordingly, the text of the
hearsay exception provides several safeguards for defendants in
child sexual abuse cases. MRE 803A guarantees “the defendant
his constitutional right to confront witnesses testifying against
him” by only admitting hearsay to corroborate a child’s in-court
testimony.92 Additionally, the exception requires that the
statement be both “spontaneous” and “without indication of
manufacture” in order to protect the accused from false
allegations.93 The defendant is further protected because the
prosecution must give the defendant notice of its intent to use
MRE 803A well in advance of trial so that the defendant has
ample time to respond.94 The text of MRE 803A clearly
indicates the intent of the legislature to protect both parties in its
creation of an exception tailored specifically to child sexual
abuse cases.95
III. PEOPLE V. GURSKY: THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT
CONSTITUTES A “SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT”
On appeal in the Gursky case in 2010, the Michigan
Supreme Court only needed to decide whether the child victim’s
statements made to an adult in 2006 satisfied the spontaneity
89

Id. at 803A(3).
Id. at 803(4), 803A.
91
Id. at 803(2), (4), 803A.
92
Radke, supra note 9, at 405.
93
See MICH. R. EVID. 803A(2).
94
Id. at 803A.
95
For a rationale of MICH. R. EVID. 803A, see ROBINSON
note 72; see also Radke, supra note 9, at 405.
90

ET AL.,

supra
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requirement of MRE 803A in order for the court to admit the
96
statements. The court interpreted one particular requirement of
MRE 803A—that “the statement is shown to have been
spontaneous and without indication of manufacture.”97
Stacy Morgan, an adult family friend of both the child victim
and her mother, gave the testimony at trial.98 Morgan testified to
corroborate statements the young child had made when she first
99
disclosed the defendant’s sexual abuse to Morgan. The child’s
disclosure to Morgan of the defendant’s sexual abuse came only
after Morgan asked the child victim “if anyone had been
touching her.”100 The victim responded that the defendant had
touched her and then “willingly gave details that exceeded the
scope of Morgan’s inquiry” and volunteered specific details
regarding how, where, and when the defendant sexually abused
her.101
After the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the
defendant’s conviction, the defendant appealed, arguing that the
statements made by the victim to Morgan were inadmissible
because they were not spontaneous, as required by MRE
803A.102 In reaching its decision that the statements were not
spontaneous, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected a totality of
the circumstances approach, and instead focused only on one
factor to reject the spontaneity– that the adult had introduced the
103
subject of sexual abuse. The court held that, because Morgan
had broached the subject of sexual abuse when she asked the
child victim “if anyone had been touching her,”104 the court
96

Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Mich. 2010).
Id. at 590–91 (quoting MICH. R. EVID. 803A).
98
People v. Gursky (Gursky I), No. 274945, 2008 WL 2780282, at *1–2
(Mich. Ct. App. July 17, 2008), vacated, aff’d on other grounds, 786
N.W.2d 579.
99
Id. at *2.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Mich. 2010).
103
Id. at 593 (rejecting the Court of Appeals’ approach, which focuses
on a variety of indicia of reliability).
104
Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2.
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could not consider any of the subsequent statements made by the
105
child as spontaneous.
In support of its decision to constrain the meaning of
spontaneous statements, the court referred to a New Jersey case,
State v. D.G.106 In State v. D.G., the child made statements in a
stressful situation where the child had been interrogated by her
aunt, who had been screaming at the child.107 In addition, the
child had initially lied and made several inconsistent
statements.108 Reiterating the holding of the D.G. case, the
Gursky court concluded that a child’s statements made during an
109
interrogation by an adult are not spontaneous.
While the court correctly read the holding of the D.G.
case,110 the court incorrectly applied that holding to the facts in
Gursky. The court failed to differentiate between two situations:
when a child is interrogated and when an adult asks a child a
question. In Gursky, none of the elements that were present in
the D.G. case existed when the victim made the statement.111
There was no indication of any screaming or interrogation by
Morgan, and no evidence suggested that the child lied.112
Further, the child volunteered specific and detailed information
about the sexual abuse in her statements, evidencing the
requisite spontaneous elements.113
In comparing the two cases and in using the D.G. case as
105

Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 593.
Id. at 590 (citing State v. D.G., 732 A.2d 588, 592–95, (N.J. 1999)).
107
D.G., 732 A.2d at 595.
108
Id.
109
Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 590 (citing D.G., 723 A.2d at 595).
110
D.G., 723 A.2d at 595. “The situation under which Michelle
disclosed the sexual abuse was very stressful. Michelle did not spontaneously
divulge information concerning the assault to Aunt Sandy, but rather Aunt
Sandy interrogated her after finding her performing questionable acts while at
play.” Id.
111
Compare D.G., 723 A.2d at 595, with Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 592,
and Gursky I, No. 274945, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July
17, 2008), vacated, aff’d on other grounds, 786 N.W.2d 579.
112
See Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 592; Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at
*2.
113
Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 592; Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2.
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support for its holding, the court essentially grouped all cases
where a child does not broach the subject of sexual abuse into
one category of non-spontaneous statements, despite the fact that
some statements possess more spontaneity than others. Clearly a
statement made by a child under the stress and pressure of the
circumstances presented in the D.G. case are less spontaneous
and present a higher risk of manufacture than the statement
made by Gursky’s victim. Further, despite citing to the D.G.
case, the court neglected to recognize that in looking to the
various factors—i.e. that the child had lied, the adult had
screamed, that the child had been interrogated—the New Jersey
court was using a totality of the circumstances approach to reach
its conclusion, and was not establishing a general rule regarding
spontaneity.114
Although the Gursky court determined that the statements
themselves were inadmissible, the court upheld the defendant’s
convictions of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual
115
conduct. The court affirmed the conviction based on the large
quantity of evidence the prosecution presented at trial, which is
not typical in a child sexual abuse case.116 The child victim,
three corroborating witnesses, and a nurse, all testified for the
prosecution.117 In fact, the prosecution did not substantially rely
on the statements at issue in proving the defendant’s guilt at
trial.118
IV. THE ELIMINATION OF MRE 803A AND THE INCREASED
DIFFICULTY FOR THE PROSECUTION
While the court’s determination that the prosecution could
not admit the hearsay testimony under MRE 803A did not affect
the holding in the specific case, the narrowing effect of the
114

See D.G., 723 A.2d at 595. For a discussion of New Jersey’s hearsay
exception, see infra Part V.
115
Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 582.
116
Id.; Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *1; see supra Part I (discussing
the rarity of physical evidence in child sexual abuse cases).
117
Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *1.
118
Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 582.
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court’s decision on the application of the exception will
negatively impact future prosecutions of child sexual abuse in
the state of Michigan. The decision substantially restricts the
statements that will constitute as “spontaneous” in such a way so
as to basically eliminate the exception altogether.
According to the holding, for a child’s statement to qualify
as a “spontaneous statement” and thus be admissible under MRE
803A, the child must have broached the subject of sexual
abuse.119 In reaching its decision, the court implied that it was
not eliminating the rule altogether. Rather, the court stated that
while “the mere fact [that] questioning occurred is not
incompatible with a ruling that the child produced a spontaneous
statement . . . . for such statements to be admissible, the child
must broach the subject of sexual abuse . . .”120 The court, in an
attempt to limit its holding, continued, “we do not hold that any
questioning by an adult automatically renders a statement
‘nonspontaneous’ and thus inadmissible under MRE 803A.”121
However, as this section explores, the court’s qualification still
renders the majority of statements made by children disclosing
sexual abuse inadmissible.
While the ruling differentiates statements made in response
to an adult broaching the subject of sexual abuse and statements
made in response to any questioning by an adult,122 the unique
123
nature of child sexual abuse and its psychological implications
make the differentiation immaterial. The scientific studies clearly
indicate that children rarely disclose sexual abuse and that when
they do, it is not the child who broaches the subject of sexual
abuse.124 Thus, a rule that only admits a child’s statements when
the child broaches the subject of sexual abuse makes most
statements inadmissible. The result is that the holding permits
admissibility in the minority of cases—where children on their
119

Id. at 591.
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
See supra Part I, for a discussion concerning the lack of disclosure in
child sexual abuse cases.
124
See supra Part I.
120
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own accord disclose sexual abuse—but blocks admissibility in
the majority of cases—where such disclosure is only made when
the child feels comfortable with the adult and the adult asks
more focused questions.125
This restrictive interpretation of MRE 803A limits the rule to
a much narrower hearsay exception that is similar to the rule in
Maryland.126 Maryland currently only permits out-of-court
statements made by a child victim to a physician, psychologist,
nurse, social worker, or other school official (i.e. a principal,
teacher, or counselor).127 Maryland’s statute is one of the most
restrictive in regards to hearsay exceptions in child sexual abuse
cases.128 As a result of the restrictive statute, cases exist where
the court acquits an alleged sexual abuser for trivial reasons, for
example, that the child’s statement was made to a police officer,
129
rather than to an individual listed under the statute. The
Maryland statute is a per se rule, in that if the statement is not
made to a qualified individual under the statute, the statement
cannot even be reviewed by the judge for reliability.130 The
highly restrictive rule fails to appropriately balance the interests
of the child against the interests of the accused.131 Such a rule
does not provide that judges and jurors analyze all of the
evidence and determine the credibility of the statements.132
Instead of balancing, the rule primarily protects the alleged
abusers, and undermines the interests of the child victims.133
The consequences of the court’s near elimination of MRE
803A, and its tendency towards a more restrictive approach
similar to the Maryland rule, is that prosecutors will face an
125

See supra Part I.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (West 2011).
127
§ 11-304.
128
McLain, supra note 10, at 21–22.
129
Id. at 23 (citing Jackie Powder, Judge’s Ban of Social Worker’s
Testimony in Child Abuse Case Upsets Investigators, BALT. SUN, Aug. 9,
1992, at 6B).
130
McLain, supra note 10, at 23–24.
131
See id. at 24.
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Id. at 24.
133
See id.
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even more difficult challenge in child sexual abuse cases, and
child sex abusers could go free. Before Gursky, prosecutors
already faced substantial challenges in combating child sexual
abuse crimes because of the little, or inconclusive, medical or
134
This lack of
physical evidence available in most cases.
evidence is a large factor in the low rate of prosecution of
sexual abuse crimes in comparison to the prosecution of other
violent crimes.135 Given the evidence that the actual incidence of
child sexual abuse is much greater than the reported number,
and given the low prosecution rate, it is clear that, even prior to
Gursky, courts needed to facilitate the prosecution of child
sexual abuse.136
Since children’s statements usually represent the central
evidence for the prosecution,137 and in most cases prosecutors
rely on a child’s out-of-court statements to identify and
prosecute the abuser,138 the holding significantly disadvantages
the prosecution. If the prosecution is unable to use these
statements, it possesses even less evidence against the alleged
sexual abuser.139 By reducing the ability of the prosecution to
introduce an adult’s testimony that corroborates the child’s
testimony at trial, the Gursky court added another obstacle for
the prosecution.140
In codifying a specific hearsay exception for child sexual
abuse cases, it is evident that the Michigan legislature realized
the importance of the admissibility of these statements at trial.141
134

London et al., supra note 18, at 194 (citing Jan Bays & David
Chadwick, Medical Diagnosis of the Sexually Abused Child, 17 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 91 (1993); Abbey Berenson et al., Appearance of the Hymen in
Newborns, 87 PEDIATRICS 458 (1991)).
135
Finkelhor, supra note 18, at 31.
136
See id.
137
London et al., supra note 18, at 194–95.
138
See McLain, supra note 10, at 29.
139
Id.
140
See supra Part II for a discussion of the corroboration requirement of
MRE 803A.
141
See supra Part II for a discussion on the reasons the Michigan
legislature codified MRE 803A and the rule’s previous history as a common
law exception to the hearsay rule known as the tender years exception.
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A decision that undermines the legislative intent by restricting
the use of the rule to a few very rare cases is unworkable.
Rather, an approach that considers the unique nature of child
sexual abuse cases and provides for the admissibility of a child’s
statements when they are in fact spontaneous, given the
circumstances under which they were made, is a more
responsible alternative that will not result in a detriment to the
prosecution and a danger to society. While limitations on the
admissibility of out-of-court statements serve important interests,
including assuring that false accusations are not admitted as
evidence against the accused, there are less restrictive means to
protect such interests that strike an appropriate balance.
V. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: A MORE APPROPRIATE
TEST FOR SPONTANEITY
An ideal test for the admissibility of statements made by a
child to an adult regarding sexual abuse needs to be cognizant of
two societal interests—protecting the accused and protecting the
victim. Courts must address two fears at different ends of the
spectrum: the fear of a false accusation, and the fear that absent
adult questioning, a child who has been sexually abused will
never disclose the abuse.142 When the Gursky court decided that
statements made by a child who does not broach the subject of
sexual abuse are generally inadmissible,143 the court addressed
the former concern, but failed to even remotely address the
latter. These interests are instead more adequately protected by
applying the totality of the circumstances test used by the
144
145
Michigan Court of Appeals, and by various other states, to
analyze the child’s statements and the questioning by the adult to
determine the admissibility of the hearsay statements.
The Michigan Court of Appeals applied the totality of the
142

See supra Part I.
Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d 579, 591 (Mich. 2010).
144
Gursky I, No. 274945, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
July 17, 2008), vacated, aff’d on other grounds, 786 N.W.2d 579.
145
Delaware, Mississippi, and New Jersey are a few states that apply a
similar test. For a discussion of those tests, see infra pp. 123–25.
143
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circumstances test in Gursky to determine the admissibility of
146
the out-of-court statements. The court considered the following
elements: the victim’s and the adult’s behavior during the
questioning, what information the victim volunteered on her own
accord, and whether the victim was prompted by the adult’s
questioning.147 One important factor the court considered was
that the victim had volunteered specific details and
148
information. Based on the facts, the court held that “[t]aken as
a whole, the victim’s statements were primarily spontaneous”
and thus admissible.149 Instead of looking to one particular
question to reject spontaneity—that the adult had broached the
subject of sexual abuse150—as the Michigan Supreme Court did,
the court looked to all the circumstances to determine whether
the statements as a whole were spontaneous.151 The appellate
court was not alone in applying this approach: New Jersey,
Mississippi, and Delaware also use similar rules.
New Jersey uses New Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(c)(27),
152
which is similar to MRE 803A. The New Jersey rule is more
lenient than MRE 803A, in that the rule permits the courts to
analyze the totality of the circumstances153 in determining the
154
trustworthiness of the statement. New Jersey, like other states,
146

Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2.
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Mich. 2010).
151
Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2.
152
N.J. R. EVID. 803(c)(27).
153
The New Jersey court reaffirmed this approach in State v. P.S., 997
A.2d 163 (N.J. 2010). “We reiterate that the totality of circumstances
standard is the appropriate benchmark for the admissibility of a tender-years
statement under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).” Id. at 182.
154
See N.J. R. EVID. 803(c)(27).
Statements by a child relating to a sexual offense. A statement by a
child under the age of 12 relating to sexual misconduct committed
with or against that child is admissible in a criminal, juvenile, or
civil proceeding if (a) the proponent of the statement makes known
to the adverse party his intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of the statement at such time as to provide him with a fair
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adopted the tender years exception to serve legitimate and
155
significant law enforcement interests. For courts to admit outof-court statements in New Jersey, the statements must “possess
‘sufficient indicia of reliability.’”156 In determining what factors
the court should analyze to decide whether the statements were
trustworthy and thus admissible, New Jersey looked to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright. There, the Court
declined to implement a mechanical test and instead considered
factors like “spontaneity, consistency of repetition, lack of
motive to fabricate, the mental state of the declarant, use of
terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, interrogation,
and manipulation by adults.”157 In applying those factors in State
v. D.G., the New Jersey court held that New Jersey Rule of
Evidence 803(c)(27) “requires the court to find . . . that on the
basis of the time, content and circumstances of the statement
158
there is a probability that the statement is trustworthy.”
New Jersey and Michigan are not the only states to
acknowledge the importance of the admissibility of such
statements by adopting exceptions to the hearsay rule in child
sexual abuse cases. Mississippi159 and Delaware160 have similar
rules. Mississippi’s hearsay exception requires the court to find
opportunity to prepare to meet it; (b) the court finds, in a hearing
conducted pursuant to Rule 104(a), that on the basis of the time,
content and circumstances of the statement there is a probability that
the statement is trustworthy; and (c) either (i) the child testifies at
the proceeding, or (ii) the child is unavailable as a witness and there
is offered admissible evidence corroborating the act of sexual abuse;
provided that no child whose statement is to be offered in evidence
pursuant to this rule shall be disqualified to be a witness in such
proceeding by virtue of the requirements of Rule 601.
Id.
155

See State v. D.G., 723 A.2d 588, 593 (N.J. 1999) (quoting State v.
D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 675 (N.J. 1988)).
156
Id. at 593 (quoting D.R., 537 A.2d at 675).
157
Id. at 594 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821–22, 827
(1990)).
158
Id. at 596.
159
MISS. R. EVID. 803(25).
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DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513 (West 2011).
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“in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
substantial indicia of reliability.”161 Mississippi courts have
similarly cited factors from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Idaho v. Wright to determine the reliability of the child’s
statements.162 In Mississippi, the court need not make specific
findings on each factor, but rather can consider all relevant
factors to determine whether enough evidence of reliability and
spontaneity exist for the court to deem the hearsay statement
admissible.163
Similarly, the Delaware rule requires a determination that the
“statement is shown to possess particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.”164 In reaching a decision, some of the factors
the court should consider include, “[t]he child’s personal
knowledge of the event,” “[t]he age and maturity of the child,”
“[c]ertainty that the statement was made, including the
credibility of the person testifying about the statement,”
“whether the statement is suggestive due to improperly leading
question,” and “whether the statement is spontaneous or directly
responsive to questions . . . .”165 In applying the rule, the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the admission of a child’s
out-of-court statements where the “[t]rial judge found there was
no known motive for her to falsify her statement, her
terminology was age appropriate, the statement was videotaped,
the questions were not improperly leading, and defendant had
the opportunity to commit the alleged act.”166
Like the Michigan Court of Appeals in Gursky, the
approaches in Delaware, Mississippi, and New Jersey focus on
an analysis of the entire statement to determine its reliability,
161

MISS. R. EVID. 803(25)(a).
Bridgeman v. State, 2009-KA-01389-COA (¶ 22), 58 So. 3d 1208,
1213–14 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822
(1990)).
163
Id. ¶ 23, 58 So. 3d at 1214.
164
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513(b)(2)(b) (West 2011).
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Id. § 3513(e)(1)–(3), (11), (12).
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Randall v. State, No. 44, 2006 WL 2434912, at *1 (Del. Aug. 21,
2006).
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and thus its admissibility. These states consider the environment
167
in which the statement was made, and how it was made. More
importantly, the states’ rules do not require that the child broach
the subject of sexual abuse.168 By looking to all the
circumstances in which a child made a statement to determine
spontaneity and reliability, the admissibility tests in these states
more adequately balance the interests of protecting the child and
the accused.
The Gursky court failed in balancing both of these interests and
seemed more concerned with the rights of the accused than with the
consequences of such a restrictive rule on the prosecution of child
sexual abuse cases.169 This failure by the court is particularly
worrisome given the evidence indicating the rarity of false
accusations170 and that there is little if any indication of a prevalence
171
of unwarranted convictions. A study in 1987 found that 8% of the
allegations in a sample of child sexual abuse allegations were false,
with 6% originating from adults and 2% originating from children.172
Another study in 1989 found the percentage of false allegations in
samples to be between 4.7% and 7.6%.173 These studies suggest that
the rate of false allegations is under 8%, and that the rate of false
allegations arising from children is even lower.174
167

Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d 579, 590–91 (Mich. 2010); Randall, 2006
WL 2434912, at *1; State v. D.G., 723 A.2d 588, 593 (N.J. 1999);
Bridgeman, ¶¶ 22-24, 58 So. 3d at 1213–14.
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See supra Part IV.
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John C. Yuille et al., The Nature of Allegations of Child Sexual
Abuse, in TRUE AND FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE:
ASSESSMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 13, at 21, 23.
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McLain, supra note 10, at 68–71 (citing Finkelhor, supra note 18, at
43, 45).
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Yuille et al., supra note 170, at 23 (citing David P.H. Jones & J.
Melbourne McGraw, Reliable and Fictitious Accounts of Sexual Abuse to
Children, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 27, 27–45 (1987)).
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Id. (citing Mark D. Everson & Barbara W. Boat, False Allegations of
Sexual Abuse By Children and Adolescents, 28 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD &
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The fear of false accusations is further undermined by the
MRE 803A protections for the accused. Most significantly,
MRE 803A(2) requires the statement be “spontaneous and
without indication of manufacture,” which is an entirely separate
175
factor the court can consider for admissibility. Further, MRE
803A only allows a hearsay statement to be introduced as
evidence “to the extent that it corroborates testimony given by
the declarant during the same proceeding.”176 Thus, the rule
recognizes the accused’s constitutional right of due process in
requiring that the accused may confront all witnesses testifying
against him or her.177 The exception is even further limited in
that it only permits testimony regarding the first corroborative
statement made by the child, despite the fact that there may have
been multiple statements.178
Notwithstanding the rarity of false accusations and the fact
that MRE 803A provides protections for the accused, the totality
of the circumstances test still adequately protects against any
false accusations. The test requires an analysis of all of the
circumstances surrounding the statement to determine the
trustworthiness of the statement.179 An application of the test
identifies spontaneity based on the circumstances in which the
175

MICH. R. EVID. 803A(2) (emphasis added).
MICH. R. EVID. 803A.
177
Radke, supra note 9, at 405. The rule balances the rights of the
accused and the potential that testifying will cause harm to the child. See
Lorne D. Bertrand et al., The Child Witness in Sexual Abuse Cases:
Professional and Ethical Considerations, in TRUE AND FALSE ALLEGATIONS
OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: ASSESSMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note
13, at 319, 320–21 (discussing evidence that testifying might cause emotional
and psychological harm to children). The child may be “revictimized” by the
experience when he or she is required to provide details relating to the abuse
and relive the experience. Id. at 320. Testifying in court is a traumatic
experience for children who have already dealt with the pain of the actual
sexual abuse itself, but the right of the accused to face his or her accuser is
an important one. Id. at 320–21.
178
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179
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questioning occurred, what questions were asked, and what the
child’s responses were to the questions. In this analysis, an
accused will be adequately protected against false accusations
because the circumstances surrounding the statements and the
statements themselves would reveal fabrication or inconsistent
testimony. The circumstances and any inconsistencies would
then be considered in the determination of the admissibility of
the statements under MRE 803A.
Aside from protecting the accused, the totality of the
circumstances test more adequately protects the child victims
than the restrictive rule announced in Gursky. If most children
will not disclose the existence of sexual abuse,180 it is necessary
for any test determining spontaneity to permit an adult to broach
the subject of sexual abuse in order to create a workable
exception. A totality of the circumstances test is more
appropriate because it allows for an adult to broach the subject
of sexual abuse so long as the child’s statements are still
spontaneous.
Research by some psychologists suggests that they would
support a totality of the circumstances test. Several psychologists
have argued that to evaluate the truth of an allegation of child
sexual abuse, objectivity is critical and many factors should be
taken into account.181 Tara Ney, a registered psychologist in
Canada who focuses on treating children and adults who have
suffered from trauma, suggests that to assess the veracity of an
allegation, the following should be considered and analyzed: the
parties involved, the specifics concerning the circumstances and
the context in which the child made the accusations, including
what the child said, and specifically, what circumstances existed
182
when the child made the initial statement. These findings
support the totality of the circumstances approach because they
favor a broad assessment of the conditions in which the
statement was made.
Additionally, studies indicate that there may actually be
180
181
182

See supra Part I.
Ney, supra note 13, at 11–12.
Id.
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benefits of directed questioning, as opposed to waiting for a
183
child’s free recall. Benefits of this type of questioning include
that children may give longer responses and include more
important details.184 Because directed and focused questioning is
much more effective in obtaining disclosure of sexual abuse than
waiting for a child to recall the incident, the court should not
discourage such questioning.185 Still, statements made in response
to directed and focused questioning should only be admissible if,
after analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the statements
on a whole were spontaneous.
Michigan has already applied a totality of the circumstances
test for the admissibility of statements using other similar
hearsay exceptions. For example, in a case concerning the
admissibility of a child’s statements made to a physician, the
court held that to determine the trustworthiness of the child’s
statement, relevant factors included: the child’s age and
maturity, how the statements were elicited, how the statements
were phrased, the use of unexpected terminology given the
child’s age, who initiated the questioning, the relationship of the
child to the adult, and whether or not there was a motive to
fabricate.186 Courts should extend this test to the application of
MRE 803A in order to avoid a complete elimination of the
hearsay exception.
CONCLUSION
Statutory history reveals that the Michigan legislature
introduced a specific hearsay exception solely for child sexual
abuse cases, because it felt strongly that the courts needed such
187
an exception. MRE 803A permits an adult, after a sexually
183

Ceci & Friedman, supra note 66, at 45–46 (citing ALFRED BINET, LA
SUGGESTIBILITÉ 255–56, 294 (1900)).
184
Id. at 45.
185
Id. at 46.
186
People v. Correa, No. 290271, 2010 WL 1979297, at *3 (Mich. Ct.
App. May 18, 2010) (citing People v. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d 621, 627
(Mich. 1992)).
187
ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 72; see supra Part II (examining how
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abused child confides in him or her, to corroborate these
statements in court in order to confirm what the child initially
said.188 Any alteration in the criminal process that makes it more
difficult for prosecutors to use the exception contradicts the very
reasoning behind its adoption.
While courts must still weed out false accusations to prevent
a wrongful conviction, it is crucial not to let this interest obscure
the need to protect children from sexual abuse. In addition to
protecting the rights of the accused, the court must vigilantly
protect evidentiary rules encouraging disclosure, recognizing the
189
various reasons why children are too fearful to disclose, and
assisting the prosecution of those who are the cause of such fear.
To facilitate prosecution, courts cannot so rigidly define
spontaneity. Instead, a totality of the circumstances approach is
more appropriate to the determination of whether a statement is
spontaneous within the meaning of MRE 803A. Such an
approach maintains the efficacy of the exception, ensures that
admitted statements are spontaneous given the context in which
they were made, and does not serve as an additional impediment
to the prosecution.

the difficulty in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases led to the legislature’s
adoption of a specific hearsay exception for these cases).
188
MICH. R. EVID. 803A(4); ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 72.
189
See supra Part I (exploring the various reasons why children are often
too fearful to disclose sexual abuse and the need for a specific hearsay
exception for corroboration of child sexual abuse).

